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Abstract
What are idiosyncratic shocks and how do people respond to them? This paper starts from
the observation that idiosyncratic shocks are experienced at the individual level, but responses
to shocks can encompass the whole household. Understanding and accurately modeling these
responses is essential to the analysis of intra-household allocations, especially labor supply.
Using longitudinal data from the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) we
exploit information about disability and health status to develop a life-cycle framework which
rationalizes observed responses of household members to idiosyncratic shocks. Two puzzling
ndings associated to disability onset motivate our work: (1) the almost complete absence
of `added worker' eects within households and, (2) the fact that single agents' labor supply
responses to disability shocks are larger and more persistent than those of married agents. We
show that a rst-pass, basic model of the household has predictions about dynamic labor supply
responses which are at odds with these facts; despite such failure, we argue that these facts are
consistent with optimal household behavior when we account for two simple mechanisms: the
rst mechanism relates to selection into and out of marriage, while the second hinges on insurance
transfers taking place within households. We show that these mechanisms arise naturally when
we allow for three features: a linkage between human capital accumulation and life-cycle labor
supply, endogenous marriage contracts and the possibility of time transfers between partners.
We also report evidence that the extended model with endogenous marriage contracts can t
divorce patterns observed in Canadian data, as well as correlations between disability prevalence
and marital status, providing an ideal framework to study intra-household risk-sharing with
limited commitment.
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Keywords: idiosyncratic risk; disability; life cycle labor supply; intrahousehold insurance
We gratefully acknowledge nancial support for this project from the Canadian Labour Market and
Skills Researcher Network (CLSRN). We thank participants at seminars/workshops at UBC, CLSRN, NBER,
EIEF, the Minneapolis Fed, IFS/UCL, Toronto, Edinburgh, Cambridge, Queen Mary for helpful discussions.
John Kennan, Sevi Mora, Victor Rios-Rull, Jonathan Thomas and Aloysius Siow provided many insightful
comments. All errors are ours.Idiosyncratic risk is a common feature of both economic life and economic models. The
measurement and eects of idiosyncratic risk have been the object of extensive research, see
among others Abowd and Card (1989), Attanasio and Davis (1996), Storesletten, Telmer,
and Yaron (2004), Meghir and Pistaferri (2006), Blundell and Preston (1998). The extent to
which individuals can insure against idiosyncratic risk, and the way in which insurance can
be provided, have also been the object of much interest.1
In the incomplete markets literature idiosyncratic shocks are often modeled as persistent
perturbations to the wage process: this approach simplies the statistical analysis of income
risk but it also presents several shortcomings. For one, it fails to distinguish between the
direct eects of a shock and the eects that are due to the optimal responses of agents, un-
derstating the economic agency problem. It becomes dicult to analyze the relevant margins
through which agents optimally respond to shocks when all idiosyncratic risk is characterized
as an unexplained wage residual. This limitations of the standard approach become even
more apparent when we look at the optimal behavior of households or couples: shocks are
experienced at the individual level, however, the responses to, and consequences of, shocks are
often determined at the household level: the signicant eects that idiosyncratic shocks have
on individual income might as well be the result of optimal household level decisions which are
not directly observed. In this paper we provide an analysis of the optimal responses of house-
holds to idiosyncratic shocks and characterize the optimal intra-household allocations which
are consistent with the observed changes in wages and labor supply associated to shocks. In
order to do this, we exploit information from changes in agents' behavior induced by health
and disability shocks.
A large economic literature on disability has focused on describing and quantifying the
costs, in terms of income and labor time loss, experienced by households with a sick or
disabled member (Meyer and Mok (2006), Charles (2003), Stephens (2001), Spector (2006)).2
In this paper we report some comparable evidence on the eects of disability in Canada:
we then show how the observed responses of individuals and households are not consistent
with a basic household decision problem. Finally we propose a household decision model that
can account for single individuals' and couples' responses to disability shocks experienced by
the household head. Our primary focus is on labor supply responses of heads and spouses
over a multi-year window following disability onset. We examine how total labor supply,
participation, and hours of work for workers vary by marital status, and by `type' of disability
1The literature on risk-sharing is very large, see for example, Kocherlakota (1996), Ligon, Thomas, and
Worrall (2002), Attanasio and R os-Rull (2000), Pistaferri, Blundell, and Preston (2004), Attanasio and
Pavoni (2007) and Heathcote, Violante, and Storesletten (2008).
2A related literature focuses on individual workers' responses to declining health or disability onset and
to the incentives provided by disability insurance programs. Recent contributions based on American data
include Burkhauser, Butler, and Gumus (2004), Kreider (1999), Autor and Duggan (2003), Low, Meghir, and
Pistaferri (2008), while some of the major contributions based on the Canadian experience include Campolieti
and Lavis (2000), Gruber (2000), Campolieti and Krashinsky (2006) and Bolduc, Fortin, Labrecque, and
Lanoie (2002). Other studies have focused on the possible added worker eect and spousal responses to
individual disability shocks. Coyle (2004), using the HRS, and Charles (1999), using the PSID, provide two
recent examples.
1shock - specically, whether or not a reported disability directly aects an individual's ability
to engage in market work. We also consider the potential role of disability in marriage
formation and dissolution, which are observed, and for intra-household allocations, which are
typically unobserved.
We design, estimate and numerically implement a model using observations from Canadian
household longitudinal data available in the 1999 and 2002 panels of the Survey of Labor and
Income Dynamics (SLID). The SLID resembles large U.S. panel household surveys such as
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
Relative to the PSID, which like the SLID follows households at all stages of the life-cycle,
the SLID has three advantages and one disadvantage. The rst advantage is that income
data is subject to less measurement error since about 70% comes from tax records. A second
advantage is that the SLID has a cross-sectional dimension about twice as large as that
of the PSID. The third advantage is that the questions posed in the disability module are
suciently detailed for us to classify subjective disability by type of limitation: specically,
disability can be latent, directly labor-limiting or directly leisure-limiting. These data oer
a view into the economic eects of disability which is much ner than what can be typically
gleaned from income-based panel studies. The one drawback of the SLID is its relatively
short six-year panel dimension, which reduces our ability to follow households over a long
horizon and requires an unbalanced panel approach.3
The layout of the paper is as follows. In section 1 we introduce a `basic' life-cycle model of
the household. In this `basic' model, households are subject to a single shock to productivity
that encompasses all idiosyncratic risk. Married (or common-law) households are comprised
of two members who maximize a joint utility objective which is an explicit function of both
members' preferences. From this simple model we draw analytical predictions about `own' and
`spousal' labor supply responses to idiosyncratic disability shocks. The model provides three
predictions: rst, married men should in general experience larger swings in labor supply in
response to disability shocks than single men, because of the insurance value of marriage;
second, if disability shocks are unanticipated and large enough to aect the household's
permanent income, we should observe a spousal labor supply response to disability onset
in the household's head, a so-called `added worker eect'; third, the eects of disability
on labor supply should not outlast the disability itself and may even lead to higher labor
supply in the long run. All these predictions are at odds with the data evidence we have
gathered: this interesting puzzle is carefully documented in section 2, where we discuss our
data sources and methodology.4 First, we observe generally larger swings in response to
disability onset for singles than for married agents. Second, in keeping with recent ndings
using U.S. data, spousal labor supply responses are mostly negligible. Third, also in keeping
3Disability is self-reported and its severity is subjectively assessed. `Justication' bias, where individuals
with lower incomes or worse labor market prospects report more disability, is a problem with all subjective
measures. However two recent studies by Au, Crossley, and Schellhorn (2005) (for health measures) and
Campolieti (2002), both using Canadian data from the National Health and Population Study, nd that
justication bias is small enough to be of less concern than standard measurement error or attentuation bias.
4Detailed empirical results from the SLID are provided in a companion empirical paper, Gallipoli and
Turner (2008).
2with U.S. ndings, the labor supply responses are quite persistent and in many cases average
hours worked continue to fall well after the disability spell has ended. An additional puzzling
feature of the data, that cannot be explained by a `basic' household model, is that singles,
both those who never marry and divorcees, report signicantly higher incidence and chronicity
of disability than do married individuals.
One potential explanation for the poor empirical performance of the `basic' model is its
lack of exibility in modeling idiosyncratic risk: in Section 3 we show that simply adding
an explicit disability shock process to the basic AR(1) model does very little to rationalize
the observed dynamic responses we observe. However, in the same section we argue that
three simple extensions to the `basic' model can go a long way in reconciling theory and data.
First, the wage process is dynamically linked to labor supply by allowing human capital ac-
cumulation through work experience: we use a framework similar to that of Shaw (1989) and
Michelacci and Pijoan-Mas (2007), which introduces dynamic considerations linking disabil-
ity onset, life-cycle labor supply and wages, and makes human capital an important vehicle
of consumption smoothing over the life-cycle; moreover, we lift two additional restrictions of
the `basic' model: (1) we make it possible for agents to self-select into and out of marriage,
and (2) we allow households to provide insurance through transfers of time, as well as con-
sumption. Substantial data evidence appears to support the empirical relevance of both these
mechanisms.
Our formulation of the marriage problem follows recent contributions to the dynamic
theory of the household, specically the idea that marriage contracts are subject to renego-
tiation whenever one spouse's participation constraint becomes binding. The introduction of
intra-marital transfers of time can be seen as a form of `home production', which households
allocate optimally to increase total labor market income and leisure. A by-product of optimal
home production is the ability of spouses to `care' for each other during periods of disability,
through what are eectively intra-household transfers of time. Importantly, this additional
channel of insurance interacts with the dynamic human capital accumulation motive to af-
fect labor supply responses of both spouses to disability onset. We conclude the section by
describing estimation and calibration of the numerical counterpart of the model.
Section 4 presents our results. We sequentially compare results from our basic/one-shock
model, the two-shock extension of this basic model, and, nally, a two shock-model which al-
lows for endogenous marital status and intra-household insurance through dierent channels
(what we call the unrestricted, or full, model). Our unrestricted model does a remarkably
good job of predicting intra-household dynamic labor supply responses to disability shocks
across marital status and severity of the disability, over a ten-year window following disability
onset, while the `basic' model, as our analytical results suggest, performs very poorly. Addi-
tionally, the unrestricted model endogenously generates correlations between marital status
and disability report rates that are extremely close to what we measure in the data. Finally,
the unrestricted model can rationalize the puzzling lack of spousal added worker eect follow-
ing a string of disability shocks to the household's head, as well as reconcile this eect with
the empirical evidence that spouses of disabled men increase the amount time spent caring
for their husbands. Based on these results we argue that our dynamic model of the house-
3hold can be useful to evaluate the changing risk-sharing value of marriage over the life-cycle
and, more generally, can be used to address questions about the extent of risk-sharing in
a limited-commitment environment. We conclude the section, and the paper, by discussing
some interesting properties of risk-sharing within marriage.
1 A Simple Model and Two Puzzles
In this section, we introduce a very simple household model and use it to derive some pre-
dictions about intra-household allocations in an economy in which all individual-level risk is
summarized (and estimated) as idiosyncratic wage shocks. We argue that such predictions
are counterfactual in at least two dimensions and that this simple model fails to capture
both the timing and nature of married workers' dynamic responses to an important class of
idiosyncratic shocks, like the ones that refer to disability and health.
1.1 A Basic Model of the Household
In what follows we introduce the simplest version of our model which has the following
characteristics: matching and marriage are exogenous and no self-selection and changes in
marital status are allowed. The lack of divorce implies that there is full-commitment between
married agents. In this `basic' model there is no home production: couples pool their income,
but there is no technology to transfer time among them.
Individuals are indexed by their gender g. For simplicity, all couples have the same age (j).
Each individual has current wage state wg, which depends on a set of observable characteristics
as well as on a random idiosyncratic shock, evolving over the life-cycle according to an AR(1)
process which we later directly estimate from SLID wage data.
Household formation is (for practical purposes) exogenous: in the rst period of life a xed
share of individuals are matched and all matches result in marriage. Matching is assortative
by education (ed) - low (high) educated women are with low (high) educated men. On all
other dimensions, matching is random. Given their respective state variables, agents choose a
marriage contract (utility weight of the wife)  which is then xed for the rest of the couple's
marriage.
In this restricted `basic' model with no divorce, individual outcomes within marriage are
fully determined by the solution of the household-level optimization problem under a given,
and invariant, marriage contract , which is chosen through an individual maximization
problem at the start of the couple's married life. Choice variables are leisure l, consumption
c, carry-forward household assets a0 and marital status. Individuals have gender-specic
discount rates g; and age-, gender- and health-specic survival probabilities &g(j;Xg), which
we shorten to &g for simplicity. The set of model state variables is summarized in table 1.
We start by describing the dynamic problem for a single individual. He or she solves the
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j (:) is the household value function for a husband and wife with state vectors Xf and Xm,
marriage contract  and exogenous, non-pecuniary gain (or cost) to being married, M. The
individual value of marriage, for partner g (with spouse ` g' and household-level vector of
members' characteristics X = fXg;X gg) is
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In equation (4) the individual value of marriage is imputed, rather than independently
solved through a maximum operator, because the optimal levels of consumption, leisure and
savings are jointly determined at the household level by solving the household planner's
maximization problem subject to contract . We initialize the utility-weighting parameter ,
given the couple's age j and state fXf;Xm;am;afg, through cooperative Nash bargaining by





















m (j;af + am;X;;M)   V C
m(j;am;af;X)  0
5Here, S (:) is the product of partners' individual surplus from marriage, conditional on at
least one partner's surplus (the male's) being positive. V C (C for \courting") is the value
of remaining single, but still able to marry for another period. In the simplest case (and in
the basic model), courtship lasts only one period, so V C
j;g(ag;a g;X) = V S
j;g(ag;Xg); i.e. if
no marriage occurs right away, the couple splits. We dene the courting problem in greater
detail in section 3. Household-level assets at the time of marriage are equal to the sum of
both members' privately accumulated assets.
The single endogenous aspect of marriage in the `basic' model is bargaining over the initial
marriage contract. Marriage occurs if both members of the potential couple nd it optimal
to marry and commit to the allocations given by . In the basic model we set M in such a
way that individuals who are matched always prefer to marry. After this, solving the married
couple's joint optimization problem becomes simply a matter of solving the household-level
problem, UH
j (:) for a given .
1.2 The Optimization Problem for Single and Married Households
A single individual of gender g and age j solves (1) subject to
1 : (~ Tm   lm)wm + (1 + r)a + b(:) = cm + a
0
















The vector Ym summarizes the set of deterministic states which determine wages. The func-
tion b(:) in the budget constraint captures all the benets and entitlements to which the
individual has access, conditional on his age, wealth, productivity and current participation.
Parameter a is a minimum level of asset holdings or maximum level of debt.
A married couple solves (12), subject to the constraint set
1 : (~ Tm   lm)wm + (~ Tf   lf)wf + (1 + r)a + b(:) = cf + cm + a
0
2a : lm < ~ Tm




where the wages of both agents follow independent AR(1) processes like the one described
in equation (6). Because we want to compare responses for married agents vs. single agents,
we dene two additional parameters f and m, which are normalized utility maximization
6weights with the property that 1
2
P
i=m;f i = 1. We assume that uj > 0, ujj < 0, and
uj(0;k) > A for A very large, where j;k 2 fc;lg;k 6= j. Similar assumptions hold for
period utility v (;). To keep the following expressions simple, and in line with our numerical
approach, we focus on the class of preferences for which ujk = 0 - that is, individual preferences
are separable in consumption and leisure. For the results that follow we consider only interior
solutions for labor and for debt holding: that is, solutions to the Lagrangian in which 2 =
3 = 0. The rst order conditions for own and spousal leisure are:
mul = 1wm (8)
fvl = 1wf
We next derive semi-elasticities for the response of men to unexpected idiosyncratic shocks.
We report semi-elasticities because our results, in the next section and in our numerical model,
we are mainly interested in observed level changes in hours worked given a percentage change
in a disability shock. Since disability shocks are very often unexpected and persistent, it
is unlikely that this type of shock can be understood as a change along a predetermined
lifecycle path, ie. that
d1
dw = 0. In this case, the uncompensated own (9) and spouse (10)

























wm < 0 (10)
For men, the uncompensated wage semi-elasticities can be decomposed into income and
substitution eects. It is not possible to sign the relative responses of married men and single
men from these equations as they will depend on specic functional forms and parameter
values. However, one important prediction, borne out in our numerical results, is that the
permanent wealth eect of shocks should be smaller for married men than it is for single men.
Intuitively, with two earners (or potential earners) in a household, the individual suering
the shock only accounts for a share of total household resources. These spousal insurance
eects hold even if a working spouse does not adjust her labour supply in response to the
shock; however, (10) predicts that she will do so if the wealth cost of the shock to the main
earner is suciently large.5
We make the following predictions for responses to negative productivity shocks:
1. there is an `added worker eect', conditional on the shock to the main earner being
suciently large (and unexpected) to alter a household's permanent resources.





dwm. Since a given increase or reduction in permanent income is shared between members
of the couple, the change in individual consumption is smaller for married men than for singles.
72. holding other things constant, married men should experience larger reductions (or
smaller increases) in labor supply following health shocks. Furthermore, the larger the
wife's relative contribution to households' total resources, the bigger the proportional
reduction in married men labor supply in response to negative earnings shocks.6
Results in the next section, and empirical evidence provided in Gallipoli and Turner
(2008), show that none of the above mentioned predictions t very well with what we observe
in data. The elasticity of single men's labor supply to disability shocks appears quite a bit
larger (more negative) than the elasticity of married men's labor supply. Added worker eects,
especially for wives, are small and basically non existent except for very chronic disability.
While this might be consistent with well-forecast health shocks and separable preferences,
the eects of disability are extremely persistent (by more than can accounted for by the
persistence of the disability itself) and imply large negative wealth eects: both these facts
are inconsistent with the basic model with perfectly forecast shocks.
2 Data Sources and Empirical Findings
Our main data source for this study is the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics
(SLID), a longitudinal survey of Canadian Households maintained by Statistics Canada. For
our purposes, the SLID has several advantages, and one noticeable disadvantage, relative to
comparable U.S. income-based panel studies and in particular to the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), which also tracks households over the entire adult life-cycle. The rst
advantage is that the SLID contains relatively accurate income data since a majority of
respondent households - about 70% in each given year - allow Statistics Canada to gather
this information from their tax records. Second, the SLID has a cross-sectional dimension
about twice as large as the PSID, measuring roughly 17,000 individuals. This large cross-
section allows us to maintain reasonable sample sizes even when we disaggregate individuals
in the sample by gender, marital status or other demographic dimensions. Finally, compared
to other income panel studies, the SLID contains relatively detailed information about the
type of disability and its direct consequences on economic life. The relative richness of these
data allows us to develop a more sophisticated model of the eects of disability than would
be possible using less-detailed work-limitation measures available in the PSID.
The major disadvantage of the SLID for our purposes is that it has a relatively short panel
dimension of only six years. The six-year window over which households are observed reduces
our ability to observe long-run eects of disability and forces us to use an unbalanced panel
approach. We briey discuss these complications, and our methods of dealing with them,
below. More details are available in Gallipoli and Turner (2008).
6A caveat is that factors other than the value of
d1
dwm determine the wealth eect on labor supply, as
shown in section 3.1.1. The wealth eect of a negative shock is increasing in male wage, which is larger
on average for married men. The relative utility weighting of male spouses in the household optimization
problem, unobservable in data, also plays a role in determining optimal labor supply responses of married
men relative to singles. The relative size of drops in labour supply for married vs. single men is therefore
analyzed and tested numerically below, in our basic model.
8Table 2: Incidence of reported disability by type in 2004
age no disability latent l-limiting n-limiting l and n-limiting
19-44 85.5% 3.0% 2.6% 1.1% 7.7%
44-69 70.9% 5.8% 5.1% 1.5% 16.6%
2.1 Disability Measures in the SLID
Our measures of disability are constructed from responses to a series of disability-based
questions in the 1999 and 2002 panels of the SLID. These are described in detail in Appendix
2. From this information, we classify disability into three broad types. Disability is denoted
as `latent' if it limits physical activity but does not directly limit activity at work, home or in
other life activities. Disability is `work-limiting' if limits the respondent at work or in other
work - or human-capital based jobs such as school or job-search. It is worth noting that
disability can have indirect eects on work even if no direct eect is present: for instance,
some respondents report being limited in their ability to change jobs or to work their optimal
number of hours even though they did not report a direct work-limitation in the current
period. Finally, disability is `leisure-limiting' if the individual reports being limited in home-
based or in other types of non-work activities uch as transportation or leisure. Table 2
reports the incidence of disability by type in 2004 for individuals aged 19-44 and 45-69 (the
ages for which all types of limitation are reported).7 As can be seen, more than half of
all reported disabilities in fact are both work- and leisure-limiting, while relatively few are
exclusively work-limiting. As well, the incidence of all types of disability is quite high and
increases sharply with age. Nearly 30% of working-age respondents over 45 report at least
some dimension of disability.
2.2 Long-run Responses to Disability: Methodology and Sample
Correction
Our methodology follows closely the approach of Meyer and Mok (2006), who in turn draw
on work by Charles (2003) and Stephens (2001). The estimating equation is as follows









kit + eit (11)
where X contains observation-specic demographic and life-cycle information including a
cubic in age; years of education; household size; number of children; a dummy for living in
a city of at least 50,000; and regional dummies8. We control for individual or family xed
eects i through the inclusion of time averages of the covariates, plus a measure of the
aected individual's average self-assessed health (as distinct from disability) over the sample.
7Incidence statistics are weighted using the cross-sectional weights provided by Statistics Canada so to
represent the Canadian population as of 2004.
8The regions are the Atlantic provinces, Ontario, Western provinces and B.C., Quebec.
9Index k, ranging from -1 to +10, denotes the number of periods from the initial disability
onset, whereas h denotes the severity of disability, or more specically, the specic sample of
disabled people on which the estimation is run (see discussion below). A represents a dummy
variable indicating the (h;k) combination under consideration. The coecients on A, b h
k, are
what we plot in the graphs in the following subsections.
Our approach diers slightly from previous studies due to the relatively shorter panel
dimension of the SLID, which requires some sample adjustment before (11) can be estimated
consistently. In contrast to the PSID, we observe individuals in our sample for a maximum
of six years. To assess a twelve-year time horizon around disability onset, we therefore rely
on individuals' reports of the duration of their current disabling condition - the number of
years they had the condition before reporting it in the SLID. The adjustments required to
create samples comparable to those used for earlier U.S. studies are described in Appendix 2
and in Gallipoli and Turner (2008). Through this adjustment process, we create a series of
samples of the disabled, two of which are considered in this paper: the "disabled" and \chronic
disabled" samples. The mean chronicity within the \disabled" sample (the fraction of years,
at or after onset, in which the individual reports a current latent or limiting disability) is 0.4
(about two periods out of six in the survey), which is the average chronicity of the aggregate
post-onset SLID population. This `chronic disabled' sample consists only of individuals who
report being disabled at least 1 out of four periods (chronicity larger than 0.25), and the
resulting mean chronicity is 0.62 or nearly four periods out of six.9
2.3 Labor Supply Responses to Disability
The primary objective of this paper is to understand and measure the labor supply responses
of dierent types of households to idiosyncratic health shocks. In this section we also report
results on the eects of disability onset on wages and family income and examine the rela-
tionship between disability reporting and marital status. Additional results on the long-term
eects of disability on households' earnings, government and private support, and savings
behavior, are presented in Gallipoli and Turner (2008). We focus only on the experience for
men and the wives of men experiencing disability. Comparable results for women can be
found in Gallipoli and Turner (2008).
Figure 1 reports our main results for men in, respectively, the `disabled' and `chronic
disabled' samples described above. We plot the estimated b h
ks from (11) in levels, from one
year prior to ten years after reported onset of the disability.10
The top panels show the changes in total annual hours worked, divided by 50 to give
9This procedure necessarily omits individuals reporting their rst ever limitation after the nal two years
of the panel: for these individuals we lack sucient post-onset information to determine chronicity.
10The omitted category (our `control' group) is described in Appendix 2, are the omitted category. Nodes
denote that the estimate is signicant at the 95% condence level. Note that most of the eects of disability
typically begin to appear one year after onset, where \onset" is the year in which a current disability is rst
reported. This is because individuals interviewed in the SLID are asked about a current disability, but hours
of work are reported for the previous year. In section 4, therefore, when comparing our simulated economies
to data, we assume that disability shocks hit at time one rather than time zero.
10an average weekly level. The middle panels show the changes in average weekly hours for
workers (those who work positive hours during the year). The bottom panels show the average
percentage point changes in participation, where (11) is estimated as a linear probability
model with the binary dependent variable taking a value of 1 if the disabled individual
worked positive hours during the previous year and zero otherwise. Figure 2 shows the
long-run responses of the female spouse to a partner's disability shock, along the total and
extensive margins.11
Figures 1-2 do not provide much support for any of the major predictions of the `basic'
model described in section 1. We focus on the eects for men. To begin, single men experience
larger and more persistent drops in labor supply than their married counterparts. On the
total hours margin, the dierence for both the disabled and chronic disabled groups is about
80% after ten years from onset, and close to 100% when accounting for the lower labor supply
(about 6 hours per week) of the single males' control group.12 The dierence is slightly larger,
around 90%, or 110% in percentage terms, on the extensive margin. Gender-onset interaction
terms (not shown), when added to the regressions, are signicant at 5% in nearly all cases
shown, except those for the intensive hours margin of the average-disabled sample.
Second, the labor supply eects of disability shocks appear to be very persistent. There
is no evidence that individuals with long term disabilities recover or adapt enough to return
to normal working, even for the sample that reports an average recurrence of only 45% of
post-onset periods. This nding is consistent with previous U.S. studies, and especially with
Meyer and Mok (2006) who also nd very persistent eects of disability on labor supply
among male household heads who report multiple years of limitation.
Third, we observe relatively small and belated added worker eects for the wives of dis-
abled men. For the average-chronicity sample (results not reported) there is apparently no
added worker eect at all, and the total hour eects for the chronic sample are typically in-
signicant even at 10%. The nding of a negligible added worker eect for wives is consistent
with recent U.S. ndings by Coyle (2004) using the HRS and Charles (1999) using the PSID.
2.3.1 Wage and Income Eects of Disability Onset
We next turn to the eects of disability onset on ln of hourly wages and on weekly family
income, where the family unit is taken to be all relatives by blood or marriage living in a
single residence.13 We again report results for males, disaggregated by marital status. For the
wage regressions, we use the panel data selection estimator proposed by Wooldridge (1995),
which has the advantage of yielding consistent estimates in the presence of an individual xed
eect. Our selection restrictions are yearly provincial unemployment rate, and deviation of
11Tables corresponding to each gure will be made available in Gallipoli and Turner (2008) and online at
the authors' websites.
12The estimated coecients corresponding to year 10 are -3.09 for marrieds vs. -5.56 for singles in the
disabled group, with the dierence signicant at 5%. For the chronic group the coecients for year 10 are
-5.45 for marrieds vs. -9.20 for singles, but the dierence is actually larger in percentage terms in periods
closer to onset.
13This is consistent with Statistics Canada's denition of the \economic family".
11this rate from its ten-year average; ow income from household wealth holdings; mother's
and father's education; and the presence of pre-school age children in the house. We plot
results for the rst eight years after onset after which the sample sizes become quite small
and the estimates (while still negative and signicant) become very noisy.
Figure 3 shows results of the eects of disability onset on wages. For married men, the
long-run drop in average wages post-onset reaches 9% for the average disabled sample and
12% for the chronic sample, very close to the estimates reported by Meyer and Mok (2006)
for PSID male household heads. For singles, the drop is correspondingly larger, dropping
below 15% of initial wage for the average-disabled sample and 20% for the chronic disabled
sample eight years after onset. This large, consistent drop in wages relative to similar-aged
healthy individuals is consistent with the human-capital or learning-by-doing story of wage
growth that we develop in subsequent section.
Finally, gure 4 predicts the average change in weekly family income, after public and
private transfers are received, over the ten years following disability onset for SLID males,
single and married. The top panel plots the drops in levels experienced by married and single
men respectively. The bottom panel (dashed lines) show the drops in income as proportions
of the average income of the future- and never-disabled control group. The story remains
much the same. Single males experience larger drops in family income than married men
once public and private transfers are received, and they experience even larger proportional
drops in income, on the order of 13% vs. 5% for the larger (and more precisely estimated)
\disabled" sample. Married men's larger initial family incomes are due in part to the fact
that they tend to have much higher wages (by roughly six dollars per hour at the mean)
and savings and in part because of their wives' earnings. The patterns are an empirical
representation of the prediction of the \basic" model of the previous section that per-capita
wealth eects of disability onset should be larger for single men than for married men.
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2.3.2 Disability, Demographics and Marital Status
To conclude this section we turn to a brief examination of the incidence and chronicity of
disability observed in the 1999 SLID panel, disaggregated by gender, education and marital
status. Table 3 shows results, weighted using the 2004 cross-sectional weights provided by
Statistics Canada. We report age-adjusted predicted probabilities from an ordered probit
regression of the frequency of disability reports (from zero to six) on ten-year age category
and dummies for gender (columns 1 and 2), education (columns 3 and 4) and marital status
(columns 5-8) respectively. The predicted values are for individuals aged 40-49.
The table shows that women are slightly more prone than men - by about two percentage
points for 40-49 year olds - to report a disability at least once. The estimated probit coecient
for the female dummy used to construct the predictions in table 3 is insignicant at 5%. Much
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gle men
larger and more signicant dierences exist by education category. Low educated individuals
are about 8.5 percentage points more likely than high-educated individuals to report at least
one disability. In terms of chronicity, a predicted 13.6% of low educated individuals report a
disability in four or more of the six years, while the corresponding number for high educated
individuals is only 8.9%.
Not surprisingly, given the results in the previous subsection, the age-adjusted results
also show strong dierences by marital status. Married (M) individuals are 8.9 percentage
points more likely to never report a disability and 4.5 percentage points less likely to report
four or more times than never-marrieds (S). Of the three unmarried groups, divorcees and
separated spouses (D) fare the worst in terms of both incidence and chronicity. Widows
(W) fall between marrieds and singles. Wald tests of the estimated coecients on the three
unmarried categories from the ordered probits show that the dierence in terms of chronicity
between divorcees and widows is signicant at 5%, but the dierence between singles and
divorcees is insignicant even at 10%. The negative eect of being currently married on the
15Table 3: Age-adjusted observed and simulated disability by marital status: 40-49 year olds
Frequency m f high ed low ed NM M S/D W
of reports (z) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
0 0.617 0.597 0.553 0.648 0.546 0.634 0.501 0.583
1 0.151 0.155 0.163 0.145 0.164 0.148 0.169 0.158
2 0.076 0.08 0.087 0.071 0.088 0.074 0.095 0.082
3 0.051 0.054 0.06 0.046 0.062 0.048 0.068 0.056
4 0.037 0.039 0.045 0.033 0.046 0.034 0.053 0.041
5 0.035 0.038 0.045 0.03 0.047 0.032 0.055 0.04
6 0.033 0.037 0.046 0.027 0.048 0.029 0.06 0.039
number of disability reports is of course strongly signicant, and is robust across dierent
denitions of disability.
3 Generalizing the Model: Marriage, Selection and In-
surance
We have established in section 1, and documented in section 2, that a basic household model
generates wrong predictions about the dynamic labor supply responses to disability and health
shocks. The questions we try to answer in this section are:
 Can we nd a way to reconcile the model's predictions with the basic stylized facts
about disability?
 Are there any interesting mechanisms at work within the households which can be
identied by exploiting information about dynamic responses to disability shocks?
 Is there a relationship between observed optimal responses to shocks and changes in
the allocation of resources within households?
 To what extent can we support alternative mechanisms using micro data at the house-
hold level?
In what follows we sequentially discuss three extensions to the basic model that help us
rationalize the labor supply puzzles described above by placing them in the context of a life
cycle family insurance problem with limited commitment:
1. we replace the standard, single-shock model with a ner two-shock representation: indi-
viduals are subject to time-stealing disability shocks as well as (orthogonal) idiosyncratic
wage shocks. The two types of shock are related (and separately identied) within a
human capital function in which prior hours of work, current disability status, and
current wage shock determine current and expected wage
162. we allow for intra-household transfers, not only in goods (income pooling) but also in
time
3. we allow for fully endogenous marital formation and divorce, including the ability of
members of a couple to renegotiate the power-sharing arrangement within the household
We describe each extension and its contribution separately, and whenever possible we
discuss its empirical relevance.
3.1 Disability Shocks and Human Capital Dynamics
This subsection introduces a model that combines a process for disability shocks with a
human capital accumulation function linking life-cycle labor supply and wages: this approach
is motivated by the evidence regarding wage dynamics after disability onset; moreover, it has
the advantage of providing a simple way to identify separate sources of idiosyncratic risk
(health versus general wage risk). Estimates of the human capital accumulation function
from the SLID suggest that a relationship between labor supply patterns and human capital
does in fact exist and does a reasonable job of capturing wage dynamics.
3.1.1 Modeling Disability
Disability shocks in our model are endowment shocks; they arrive in two forms: labor-limiting
(n) and leisure-limiting (l). Dierent combinations of fn;lg constitute the dierent ds
states, including the \healthy" state ds 1, in which n = l = 1. The  shocks are modeled
as multiplicative factors that `steal' time from individuals by increasing the amount of total
time required in order to, respectively, complete a given amount of market work or enjoy a
given amount of leisure.
As described in detail in section 2 and Appendix 1, the disability module in the SLID allows
us to distinguish between these two types of limitation (and between limiting disabilities and
`latent', non-limiting disabilities).14 We will see that the presence of both types of shock has
implications for the life cycle insurance problem and for optimal responses.
14Burkhauser, Daly, Houtenville, and Nargis (2002), drawing on work by Nagi (1965, 1991), describe
disability as an economic phenomenon. This is also the way we conceive disability in this paper. Disability is
understood as the third stage of a three-stage process. The rst stage is the \pathology", an actual physical
limitation such as blindness. The second stage is \impairment", the ways in which the pathology limits the
individual in everyday life, such as the inability to run or walk quickly. The third stage is \disability": the
limitations on economic life or productivity created by the impairment; e.g. blindness would be a severe
disability for a policeman. Individuals who report `latent' disabilities in our data are those who report one or
more physical impairments but no corresponding direct limitation in work or leisure. As we observe in our
data, for those with chronic conditions, impairments can develop into disabilities if, for instance, an individual
has to change employers or occupations. Similarly, chronic disabilities can be downgraded to impairments if
the impaired individual substitutes toward alternative leisure activities for which his impairment is irrelevant.
As well, impairments can alternate between being work-limiting or leisure-limiting based on changes in both
the condition and other aspects of an individual's situation.
17To reduce complexity we assume that only main-earners (males in the model15) are subject
to health and disability shocks: therefore men have two additional individual state variables
to those given in table 1: ds, which indexes current disability status, and rsk, which captures
underlying health, or equivalently a man's risk of becoming, and remaining, disabled. To
clarify concepts, we restate the maximization problem from section 1 for a married couple in
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To keep the following expressions simple, we assume that disability realizations have no
direct eect on the wage. Disability aects both the household period budget constraint (1)
and (in contrast to a wage shock) also the husband or male head's feasible time constraint
(2a). The eects are depicted graphically in gure 5 for the case of a n shock. So long as
an interior solution for leisure is optimal, a positive n shock operates exactly like a negative
wage shock in rotating the household budget constraint inward along the x (consumption)
axis. (The eect of a l shock would rotate the budget line inward along the y- (leisure) axis.)
However, unlike a wage shock, a n shock has the additional eect of rotating the feasible
time allocation between labor and leisure inward along the y (labor) axis.
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15Some recent evidence about the higher labor supply and wages of men can be found in Knowles (2007).
18Figure 5: Disability and Household Optimality Constraints
(a) Labor-limiting disability: Household
budget
























These semi-elasticities are similar to the ones given in (9-10) for the basic one-shock
model. The key dierence is the inclusion of a third term in the labor response: the \time
loss" eect, which limits the physical possibilities available to disabled individuals in terms
of eective labor and leisure, as depicted in the second panel of gure (5) for a labor-limiting
shock. As we will see in section 4 below, this simple extension improves the t of the model in
terms of dynamic responses by dampening the positive wealth eect on labor supply due to
a shock, but it is not sucient to solve the puzzles we documented in section 1.In particular,
if disability shocks impose permanent costs on households, we should still expect to see a
spousal added worker eect in response to disability onset in a main earner. Adding time-
limiting disability shocks as a separate process also does not reverse the prediction, introduced
in section 1, that permanent wealth costs of disability onset for marrieds are smaller than
those for singles due to the eect of spousal insurance.
3.1.2 Measuring Disability Shocks and Health Risk
We calibrate the process for disability as follows: during the working life (before age 66),
disability follows a six-state Markov transition process that varies by age, sex and disability
risk (rsk). The ds=1 is the healthy or, equivalently, non-disabled state whereas ds=2 is a
state of latent disability in which the individual does not know if his condition will progress
to a direct limitation. In ds=3 individuals are leisure-limited only and in ds=4, individuals
are labor-limited only. In ds=5 or 6 individuals are both leisure and labor-limited, with
the combined severity of the limitations greater in ds=6. The denitions of `latent', `labor-
limiting' etc. are exactly as dened in sections 1 and 2. Each ds state is associated with
19unique values of n and l, which we calibrate by using the average labor hours supplied by
prime-age singles in each ds state.
Individuals older than 65 are subject to a separate six-state transition matrix based on
the severity of leisure limitation. The leisure-limitation indicator is based on two limitation
questions (limited `at home' or limited `in other activities', including leisure), each with a
two-level answer (limited `sometimes' or limited `often'). We construct an index from these
responses running from zero to four, and allow an additional ds state for latent limitations,
giving us six states. Because we do not observe labor supplies of individuals over 70, we
simulate a special group of single men who transition to the retired transition matrix at 55,
and match their simulated labor supplies to observed labor supplies of individuals 55 and
over in the SLID who have the corresponding leisure limitation index value but no current
labor limitation. The eect of this exercise is to generate a life-cycle prole of disability in
which both the frequency and magnitude of leisure shocks increases as individuals get older.
For both processes, we estimate Markov transition matrices between ds states by a multi-
variate dummy variable regression of ds on lagged ds. The matrices are estimated separately
by gender, rsk and age, using the eleven-year age interval around the age in question. To
calibrate the process for rsk, we run a probit regression in which the dependent variable is an
indicator for having a disability during the course of the panel and the regressors are similar
to those used in the propensity matching exercise described in Appendix 2, including age
terms. We cut the data at the median so that half of the population is \high" rsk and half
\low" rsk. We assume that individuals enter the model in rsk state 1. Over the life cycle,
they face an increasing probability of switching permanently to rsk 2 which we take directly
from our regression; by age 70, over 95% of the simulated population, and about 98% of the
SLID population of men, is in rsk level 2. As well, a small number of individuals in the model
enter a special high-rsk state 3, which is a state of permanent disability. Individuals enter
rsk 3 only from ds 5 or 6. We calibrate the switching risk for rsk 3 in order to generate a
degree of chronicity of disability similar to the one observed in data.
3.1.3 Human Capital Accumulation and Wage Dynamics
The second component of our two-shock process comprises idiosyncratic shocks to human cap-
ital and wages. We propose a process for wages that assumes their evolution as a by-product
of past labor market decisions. In particular, we assume that past levels of labor supply have
an eect on the current stock of human capital: this amounts to a specic type of `on-the-job-
learning'. To assess the empirical relevance of this assumption we follow a strategy originally
developed by Shaw (1989). Human capital is dened as Ht+1 = (nt;Ht;n;t+1;ed;vt+1;t+1)
and it is mapped into wages by some function wt = G(Ht). In what follows, hours of work are
denoted as n and the stock of human capital as H. Human capital earns a market return Rt in
year t. Individuals accumulate human capital through market work, and their existing stock
at a point in time is subject to depreciation. Education (as completed years of schooling) and
work-limiting disability status aect the human capital stock directly, as well as indirectly
through the existing stock of human capital and hours worked. Human capital also responds
20to aggregate shocks,  (captured through the inclusion of year dummies) and to individual,
non-health shocks vit.16 The associated process for the evolution of wages can be represented
as:
wit = RtHit (17)
ln(Hit+1) = 1 ln(Hit) + 2 ln(Hit)




it+1 + t+1 + vit+1




To Shaw's basic framework we add (work-limiting) disability status and its interactions with
current human capital stock. Our specication assumes the rental rate of human capital R
to be constant across the years in our sample, which allows us to estimate the system in logs
rather than levels by replacing (unobserved) ln human capital with (observed) ln wage rates
in the human capital equation.17 We also allow for endogeneity of lagged hours and wage
rates, including the possibility that vit is auto-correlated, though we nd evidence that it is
not.18 Details of our estimation strategy are given in the rst section of Appendix 2.
Our best specication for the human capital process, for both men and women, is reported
in table 4, along with summary statistics that are generated in our simulated economy. The
male and female human capital processes have the same functional form. The estimated
and simulated variance of the shock is slightly larger for women at .050, compared to .048
for men. In our numerical model, women are not subject to disability shocks; however, we
include work-limiting shocks as regressors in the empirical human capital equations for both
genders. From our estimations, women in the SLID do not appear to suer a direct human
capital loss from their disability shocks: the coecients on work-limiting disability and its
interactions are insignicant.
For men, several additional results are worth noting. First, disability does appear to have
a direct negative eect on male human capital (wages), and this eect is non-monotonic:
gure 6 shows that the eect of work-limiting disability on ln human capital decreases then
increases in the current human capital stock. Around the median wage of $15/hr, these direct
16For estimation purposes, the idiosyncratic shock vit+1 might be correlated with Ht (for example, when
vit+1 exhibits autocorrelation). In Appendix 2 we provide evidence that vit is well approximated by an i.i.d.
process. However, even ruling out autocorrelation in vit, and controlling for individual xed eects, the lag
of annual hours worked is likely to be correlated with the error if people form expectations on future shocks.
For instance, Olivetti (2006) interprets the vit shocks as specic characteristics of a job that is not conducive
to human capital accumulation. If individuals anticipate moving into such job, they may have less incentive
to work hard in the previous period.
17In this assumption, we follow Imai and Keane (2004) who posit a broadly similar model to assess the
intertemporal substitution in labor when there is human capital. Since we are estimating human capital using
only three years of data on the right hand side, this seems a relatively low-cost simplication.
18Even if vit is not autocorrelated and we can control for individual xed eects, the lag of annual hours
worked is likely to be correlated with the error if, as it seems possible, hours worked in one year aect the
human capital stock and wage rate in that year. The annual time dimension of the panel makes this type of
endogeneity very plausible. For example, Miller and Sanders (1997) estimate a human capital equation with
monthly lags and nd that the contribution of past hours to current human capital diminishes very rapidly.
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eects are quite small: just over 2% of the total wage. They are much higher for low-income
workers and moderately higher for workers at the upper tail of the wage distribution.
Second, the eects of hours worked on human capital are increasing in the current stock
of human capital, due to the inclusion of the interaction term n  ln(H). Moreover, this
eect is much stronger for men than for women. The eects of annual (weekly average) hours
worked on men's and women's next-year's human capital are shown on the left hand side of
gure 7 at wages of $14 and $18 per hour. The direct returns to hours worked for women are
negligible compared to those for men.
Third, the persistence of the human capital stock (that is, one minus the rate of decay) is
increasing over the existing human capital stock.19 The net eect is shown in the second panel
of gure 7 for healthy men, disabled men and women, all with the median level of education in
the economy. Complementary to the returns-to-work eects, depreciation of existing human
capital is much higher for men than for women.20 Depreciation of the human capital stock is
also highest for disabled men (the green dashed line). Combined with relatively low returns
to hours worked in the left tail of the human capital distribution, the net eect can be that
chronically disabled men, who are often not able to work full time, can be caught in low-wage
traps.
19Since many of the time-averages of the covariates are omitted from the reported and simulated human
capital process, the constant term reported in the table is not the same as from the regression; it is adjusted
to produce the mean wages in the male and female SLID sample in the simulation.
20As might be gleaned from gure 7(b), our quadratic specication for wages implies that returns to lagged
human capital in terms of current human capital are monotonically increasing over the distribution of H.
The eect is to generate an unreasonable process for human capital accumulation at high end of the wage
distribution, where the SLID provides us with relatively few observations to achieve a t. In this draft, we
circumvent this problem by having wages plateau at values above $40 per hour; that is, once an individual
achieves a wage at or above this value, it remains there unless or until a series of negative shocks pushes it
back down. This assumption aects about 5% of men and less than 1% of women in the simulation. The
issue is revisited in forthcoming work.
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n 16040 16004
Summary statistics: human capital
Mean H $17:75 $15:25
Var ln H .245 .265
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3.2 Intrahousehold Transfers of Time and `Caring'
The second component of our augmented model is the ability of spouses to engage in optimal
time management through task-sharing21. Analytically, this amounts to a form of home
production that allows the couple to reap economies of scale in total disposable time, similar
to economies of scale in consumption typically assumed in household models. In the absence
of disability, this feature of the model is simply a way of modeling home production as optimal
time management. In the presence of disability, these time transfers allow the healthy spouse
to alleviate the disutility experienced by the aected spouse by increasing the amount of
leisure he can enjoy, a process we refer to as \caring". Our estimation and calibration process
for intrahousehold time management turns on the assumption that the technology for time
transfer when one partner is disabled does not dier fundamentally from the technology when
both partners are healthy.
The basic assumption underlying this section is that all individuals are endowed with a
given number of waking hours in a week. Out of this natural endowment, every individual
must devote some number of hours of non-labor, non-leisure tasks, denoted nlli, and these
tasks must be completed before labor and leisure decisions can be made. The time required
for individual i to complete the tasks in his own nll bundle, in the absence of task-sharing, is
hi. We assume that neither nll nor h varies directly with marital status, but they do vary with
age and with demographic factors correlated with marriage, including the number of children
in the household. Total hours spent in all nll activities is denoted ~ hi for individual i. Since
intrahousehold time transfers are only feasible in multi-member (i.e. married) households, ~ hi
is simply equal to hi for singles. Married partners, however, have the option of allocating the
21Our model is a variant on home production model originally introduced by Gronau (1973) and Gronau
(1977). A very interesting treatment of home production versus labor market participation can be found in
Rios-Rull (1993).
24tasks in their respective nll task bundles optimally between them so that ~ hi diers in general
from hi for marrieds.
We denote the spousal transfer of time for individual i as hi;i = fm;fg, and the technology
for time transfer is i, with 
0
i  0 and 
00
i  0. When the wife devotes hf hours to completing
some amount of her husband's nll tasks, she \returns" f(hf) hours to him, which he can
then devote to labor and/or leisure. A similar relation, with technology m(hm) exists for
the husband, capturing his ability to \return" time to his wife by completing tasks in her nll
bundle. For the general case, it is assumed that each partner specializes in the tasks within
couple's combined nll activities in which he/she the greatest comparative advantage. As a
result, it may be optimal for both partners to simultaneously \transfer" time to each other
in order to increase the couple's aggregate wealth, measured as post-nll time endowments
multiplied by wages.
We denote the wage ratio (in levels) of the couple,
wf
wm = w. The couple's complete
problem can now be written:22
V M
j (X;a;;M) = max
fcm;cf;lm;lf;hm;hf;a
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budget : (~ T   llm)
wm
n
+ (1 + r)a + b + (~ T   lf)wf   cm   cf = 0 (18)




lf : lf = ~ T  0
~ Tm : ~ Tm = T   hm   lhm + f(hf)  T






m = m(nm;wm) (19)
At an interior solution, abstracting from human capital considerations, the rst-order










Focusing on the model in which only husbands are subject to disability shocks and there is
no human capital component to wages, it is easy to show that, so long as an interior solution
22Since the leisure-limitation questions in our data source include questions about the ability to perform
tasks in the home, we assume that time transfers from the husband to the wife are also subject to time loss
from l. However, as can be seen, we also assume that the time transfers received from a spouse are not
reduced by a factor l. This assumption slightly strengthens the results reported in the subsequent sections
but is not indispensable.
25for both members' labor supply continues to hold,
dhf
dn  0 (
dhf
dn < 0 if f is strictly concave)
and
dhf
dl = 0. In a forthcoming extension, we show that these predictions fail to hold (1) when
the husband's participation constraint becomes binding, in which case
dhf
dl > 0 and (2) in the
presence of human capital accumulation, in which case the result that
dhf
dn < 0 is weakened,
and in fact it is possible though unlikely that
dhf
dn  0.
Next, we dene hi as the dierence between total hours spent on nll activities and the
amount of time the individual would spend on nll hours if single: ~ hi   hi, with hi = 0
for singles. Then the equations for total amount of time devoted to (own and spousal) nll
activities for husbands and wives respectively can be written:
hm = hm   f(hf)
hf = hf   m(hm) (21)
We require functional forms for the time-transfer technology that allow us to nd closed-
form solutions for hm and hf and that satisfy 
0
i  0 and 
00
i  0 if i = fm;fg. A simple

























In theory, this system can be estimated on data using information on wage rates and
the nll activities for single and married men and women. Unfortunately, we are not aware
of any Canadian data source that contains information both on nll activities and on wages.
Instead, we use U.S. data taken from the 1990-2005 panels of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) and the 2004 and 2005 panels of the American Time Use Study (ATUS).
The PSID gives us some information on disability experienced by household members both in
cross-section and over time. It also provides a measure of housework performed by heads of
households and their spouses. The ATUS provides more detailed data on daily time use for
a sample representing the current U.S. population. From this data, we are able to calculate
the average share of nll activity devoted to housework in the ATUS and impute total nll










activity to individuals in the PSID. Details on the estimation strategy are available in data
Appendix 1. Details on exactly how we determine nll activity from the ATUS is available in
Turner (2008). Table 5 gives our estimates. As can be seen, there is very little evidence that
men make time transfers to their wives; but it does appear that women can and do make
time transfers to their husbands.
An important question is how exactly nll time, and specically h of one partner, changes
when the other partner, in the context of our model the husband, receives disability shocks.
Within the model, a n shock should lower h while a l shock should have no eect (at
interior solutions), unless human capital considerations change these results. In section 4, we
reports some evidence that intrahousehold time transfers from husband to wife increase when
the husband experiences disability due to the wife's desire to keep him in the labor force, and
that our model captures these eects.
3.3 Household Formation and Dissolution
In the unrestricted framework households can be of four types: courting (C), single (S),
divorced (D), or married (M). Time-varying individual-level state variables are again sum-
marized by vector Xm = fwm;ds;rskg for men and Xf = fwfg for women, and dene a
couple-level state space is X = fXm;Xfg for married and courting households. Household
formation evolves in the following way: in the rst period of life individuals are matched
exogenously with a member of the opposite sex. Like in the basic model, matching is assorta-
tive by education but random on all other dimensions. Couples who are matched but not yet
married (or cohabiting) are dened as `courting'. Courtship lasts for a maximum of N = 6
(compared to N = 1 for the basic model) years. If at the end of this period the members of
the couple do not get married, they split and remain single for life. Once married, couples
remain together until one (or both) prefers to exit the marriage, transiting into the single
state (divorce) or dies. Once a couple splits, both partners remain single for the remainder
of their lives.23
23Mazzocco (2004) refers to models of this kind as dynamic collective models without commitment. A clear
categorization of this model is dicult, as discussed by Browning, Chiappori, and Lechene (2006).
27The evolution of assets in the model depends on marital states: courting couples who
choose to marry combine their assets so that a = am+af in the rst period of marriage. When
couples divorce, assets, net of divorce costs, are divided between the two single households
according to aD
g = aD
g (a), where a is the married household's stock of assets. Finally, when a
spouse is widowed, he or she inherits all the household's assets: aW
g = aW
g (a) = a.
The ability to commit to a xed marriage contract (as in our `basic' model) is important
because commitment allows the household to make ex-ante ecient decisions that are not
necessarily ex-post time-consistent for both partners under all realizations of uncertainty.
Removing commitment has two eects: rst, by adding a set of marriage participation con-
straints to the household optimization problem, it eectively reduces the feasible choice set
relative to the full-commitment case. Second, it reduces the insurance value of marriage be-
cause partners who receive a series of bad shocks may be divorced or see their power over
household decisions reduced.
Below we sketch out the basic elements of household formation and composition. Our
choice of equal-weighted Nash bargaining over the marriage surplus, already described in
section 1 is a convenient simplication in the dynamic collective literature and was originally
proposed by Manser and Brown (1980). The renegotiation and divorce mechanism described
here is drawn from Mazzocco and Yamaguchi (2007). The remaining aspects of the model
are our own innovations.
After a couple is married and choose their optimal starting , (which we denote  here),
they continue in married life under this contract until one partner nds it suboptimal to





















where V D is the value function associated with divorce and D is an exogenous non-pecuniary
utility weight associated with the divorced state. There is a one-time nancial cost of divorce,
borne equally by both partners, of dc(ed) which diers by the education level (ed) of the
husband. We set dc(l)=7,500 for low-educated husbands and dc(h)=12,500 for high-educated
husbands, based roughly on the average cost of divorce in Canada in 2000 and the average
increase of the cost of divorce with household income. Divorce settlements divide existing





is a standard assumption in the collective literature given current divorce law in Canada and
the U.S. { see footnote 2 in Mazzocco and Yamaguchi (2007) for a discussion.
Not all failed marital contracts need end in divorce. It is possible that when the marriage
participation constraint binds under the current , a 0 can be `renegotiated' that induces
both partners to stay in the marriage and thereby produces a Pareto improvement relative
to the no-renegotiation benchmark. In choosing this 0, we directly follow Kocherlakota
(1996) and Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002), who show that the most (ex-ante) ecient
re-bargaining process (i.e. the one minimizing the insurance loss from non-commitment)
selects ^  to be the  closest to  for which both partners' participation constraints once
more hold with inequality. Formally:






















If a solution to (26) does not exist, then the couple divorces. Couples can renegotiate and/or
divorce at any point during the life-cycle. For reasons of tractability, we do not allow remar-
riage for divorcees or widows. However, even without remarriage, we will see that the ability
to renegotiate and exit marriage has large eects on intrahousehold responses to shocks.
Given this structure, we can nally dene the individual value functions in detail. In order
to make exposition of the maximization problems easier, we dene a `generalized' value func-
tion denoted as j;g. By `generalized' we mean that j;g subsumes the value when married,
single, courting or divorced, and can take dierent numbers of arguments depending on g's
current marital status. We start by describing the dynamic problem for the single/divorced













The divorcee's value function is nearly identical, except for exogenous utility weight D

























We now also dene an individual value function, for married partner g (with spouse ` g'):
V M































j;g(X;aD(a);D) if V M
j; g(X;a; ^ ;M) < V D
j; g(X g;aD
 g(a);D)
29The previous conditions state that an individual's generalized value function during mar-
riage, conditional on renegotiation of , is always equal to the greater between value of being
single and value of remaining married, so long as his/her partner also wants to remain mar-
ried. Because both partners must commit to continuing the marriage, if either spouse prefers
divorce, then divorce occurs and both members' value functions are set to V D
j;g.
Finally, we dene the following value function for a courting individual (i.e. an individual

























j; g(X;a;)  V C
j; g (X;ag;a g)
V C
j;g(X;ag;a g) if V M
j; g(X;a;) < V C
j; g (X;ag;a g)
where a = am+af. This problem resembles the one for married agents insofar both members of
the courting couple must wish to marry before the marriage can take place, and each member's
ability to optimally choose his marital status is dependent on the partner's willingness to
marry.
Note that, in the Nth year of courtship V C
j+1;g = V S
j+1;g for g = ff;mg. As described above,













3.4 Numerical Counterpart of the Model
In the remainder of this section, we outline additional salient features of our numerical model.
These features apply to both the `basic' and `augmented' versions of the model.
3.4.1 Policy Environment and State Space
The simulated economy is populated by one-member (single) and two-member (married)
households, consisting of individuals who dier permanently by education (ed) and gender (g).
The state space of individuals is Xi = fH;ds;rskg, where H is the individual's current stock
of human capital (or current wage), ds is his or her disability state, rsk is the individual's dis-
ability risk { that is, the set of probabilities associated with moving between disability states
in future periods { and i 2 fm;fg. For married households, XM = fHf;Hm;dsm;rskmg
due to our simplifying assumption that only males are subject to disability risk. Households,
whether one-member or two-member, dier additionally by the age of their head, j (which is
also the age of the spouse where applicable), and by their asset holdings, denoted a. For all
individuals, the maximum lifespan is 90 years, with age-, gender-, disability-conditional sur-
vival probabilities &
g;ds
j taken from Canadian vital statistics.24 Men and women in the model
24We thank Kevin Milligan for providing us with the Canadian mortality data.
30may work until age 65. All values in the model are expressed in 2002 Canadian dollars. A
model period is one year, but all ow values and results are expressed as if individuals lived
for one representative week out of the year.
Policy in the model is based roughly on the existing patchwork of Canadian disability,
retirement and anti-poverty programs. Individuals older than 65 receive a benet of $115 per
week, which approximates the universal Canadian Old Age Security Benet. Individuals 60
or older additionally receive a retirement benet in any year they do not work (automati-
cally after 65). The retirement benet equals 25% of the potential full-time earnings of the
individual based on his wage at age 60. Disabled individuals are eligible for a benet equal
to 19% of their current accumulated retirement benet (based on their current wage) plus a
lump sum pf $95, also conditional on nonparticipation. Benet determination and eligibility
in the model approximate the rules governing the retirement and disability benets avail-
able to individuals under the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan (CQPP).25 As with both CQPP
and workers' compensation, the disability benet is only available to individuals in disability
states with a `qualifying severity' of n, specically ds=6 or who are chronically disabled (rsk
state 3).26 To fund retirement and disability benets, individuals face a payroll tax of 9.9%
(the Canadian CPP payroll tax rate). There is also a progressive income tax with brackets
of f21:2;31:8;42:1;46:4g on income above f$9;600;$47;485;$84;320;$132;784g, which are
approximately equal to 2008 rates and brackets for the median Canadian taxpayer.27 Tax
revenues not spent on social security are wasted. Since Canada, unlike the U.S., has a univer-
sal set of provincial means-tested welfare programs, individuals may receive welfare payments
conditional on: (i) holding less than $60 (annual equivalent $3000) in household assets and,
(ii), all household members not working, regardless of disability status or age.
Our model is a partial equilibrium economy with no aggregate shocks and no exogenous
growth. The interest rate is xed at 4.2% and the market wage rate is normalized to 1.
25To simplify the computations, the \CPP" benet individuals receive is a function of their human capital
at age 60 rather than their eligble earnings over the lifetime. Since the stock of human capital in the
model is fairly constant over time, we believe this is a reasonable approximation that involves relatively little
computational cost. This study began with a detailed study of Canadian disability policy since 2000 which
is available from the authors on request.
26It could be argued that eligibility rules for the disability benets actually approximate more closely
those that govern provincial workers' compensation (WC) programs, which explicitly allow payments for
temporary disabilities. WC programs are more generous but less universal than CQPP and usually require
and/or directly encourage an eventual return to work unless disability can be shown to be permanent.
27The median taxpayer by rates on income other than capital gains and dividends lives in Ontario. We
calculate these rates based on the federal standard exemption and the smoothed combined provincial and
federal rates.
313.4.2 Preferences























































l ; ~ T is post-nll disposable time; n (again) denotes hours of market work;
1
! is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption; 1
  is the intertemporal (Frisch
or marginal-utility-of-wealth-compensated) elasticity of substitution in leisure; ~ n is a age-
education-marital status-specic consumption weight; c, l capture the relative preference
weightings of consumption and of leisure in overall period utility; and (ms);ms 2 fs;m;dg
are the multiplicative scale factors capturing the relative enjoyment of consumption and
leisure in each marital state.28
We set !f = !m = 2:0, which are in the middle of the range of inter-temporal elasticities
found in the empirical consumption literature. The s and  s are calibrated to match,
respectively, the average labor supplies of prime-age non-disabled men and women (those in
ds=1 { see below) and the average Frisch or (compensated) inter-temporal elasticity of labor
supply substitution of prime-age men and women. For the latter, we use target estimates
from the empirical life-cycle literature on labor supply using a MacCurdy (1985) life-cycle
framework with uncertainty. Given our specication of preferences, the time-varying Frisch
elasticity of labor n
t is ( lt
nt
1
 ), which we calculate by averaging over the relevant simulated
sample of single males and single females between 25 and 54.
The ~ n consumption factors are calculated from information from the SLID and the tra-
ditional OECD equivalence scale, assigning a weight of 1 to the rst adult in a household, .7
to every additional adult and 0.5 to every child. Conditional on the initial choice of marital
status (whether or not to marry), these weights are xed. Consumption by married individ-
uals is therefore increased by a factor of (1/0.85) in all childless years and by a factor greater
than one in years in which children are present. Married couples have two children, the rst
at age 26 and the second at age 32, and both children are supported for 18 years. Single
men and women have no children. Divorcees share the consumption costs of their children.
If divorce occurs at or before the dates of conception of one or both children, then the child
is or children is not born; divorcees support only the children who are already alive when
the divorce occurs. Disposable time, ~ T { before intrahousehold time transfers take place {
is assigned using information from the regressions described in 3.2. The baseline nll costs
of children within a marriage are the values that single and divorced parents devote to their
28Widows are assigned (d).
32ospring. Within married couples, of course, they values may be dierent due to optimal
choices over intracouple time allocation.
Finally, individuals discount the future at rate g, which varies by gender. From Statistics
Canada summary data, we observe that the asset to income ratio is about 2.2 for married
couples and that households with male members hold roughly 1.5 times as many assets as
households with female members. We use these gures as targets for our gs.
3.4.3 Calibration
From the above discussion, we have a total of fourteen parameters to calibrate: fgg29,
fn(k)g, fl(3)g; f gg, fgg, fa;g and f(m);(d)g for : g 2 fm;fg, k = f4;5;6g. The
corresponding targets are the mean weekly labor hours of prime-age single women, and of
prime-age single men in each ds state; male and female Frisch-compensated elasticities of
intertemporal labor substitution; the household wealth-to-income ratio; the relative stocks
of assets held by single men and women; the responses of married women to changes in
the household wage ratio and the distribution of nll activities among the married female
population; and the (Canadian) national marriage and divorce rates.
The Frisch targets are set to 0.5 for men, following Domeij and Floden (2005) who use
real and simulated data to argue that this is the appropriate value for men in the absence
of credit constraints. There is some agreement in the literature that Frisch elasticity for
females is around twice as large as that for males. We therefore set our female Frisch target
to 1.0. These empirical estimates are not strictly correct in the context of our model for two
reasons: rst, because they are based on a transformation of the rst-order condition for labor
supply that does not include an intertemporal component (see MacCurdy (1985) or Pencavel
(2002) for overviews of the methodology underlying this literature); and second because the
life-cycle labor literature typically uses as disutility-of-labor utility function rather than a
utility-of-leisure, though the two are so closely related that, in the absence of human capital
considerations, the labor elasticity of one implies the leisure elasticity of the other.
Results from the calibration exercise are reported in the rst part of Section 4 below.
4 Results
Table 6 gives the calibrated parameters and associated targets in the full augmented model.
The choice of the targets is explained in previous sections. The exact value of some of the
targets (marked  in table 6) are temporarily withheld in deference to Statistics Canada's
disclosure policy. All results in this section are from simulations of 16,000 potential couples
(32,000 individuals), 50% male and 50% female.
In the full, unrestricted model, all individuals are matched in the rst period of life with a
member of the opposite sex. Of these, 88:5% choose to get married within the courting spell,
29Although there are two s per gender, l for women and c for men are normalized to 1.
33Table 6: Calibrated parameters and targets: augmented model
Parameter Value Target Value: data Value: model
f
c 1.4 Single f. na 26.4 25.2
m
l
b 24.2 Single m. n in ds 1c 35.5 35.7
 f 2.4 Male Frisch elasticity of n .50 .49
 m 2.9 Female Frisch elasticity of n 1.0 1.10
!f 2.0 Taken from literature
!m 2.0 Taken from literature
l;ds=3 1.13 Single m. n in ds 3  32.0 32.0
n;ds=4 1.36 Single m. n in ds 4  29.0 30.1
n;ds=5, l;ds5 1.11, 1.09 Single m. n ds 5  23.0 26.0
n;ds=6, l;ds6 1.36, 1.37 Single m. n ds 6  6.0 8.0
l;ds(r)=3
d 1.11 Single m. n in ds(r) 3  32.0 32.0
l;ds(r)=4 1.37 Single m. n in ds(r) 4  29.0 30.1
l;ds(r)=5 1.69 Single m. n in ds(r) 5  23.0 26.0





(m) 1.017 P(marry)g 90% 88.5%
(d) 1.011 P(divorce)h 21% 19.3%
a
Prime-age (25-59) unmarried female labor supply
b
m
c is normalized to 1.0; f
c is normalized to .8.
c
Prime-age (25-59) unmarried healthy male labor supply
d
ds states for retirees' leisure limitation transition matrix
e
Household wealth to income ratio for hhs with male members
f
Ratio of asset holdings for hhs with female and male members
g
Proportion of individuals who marry
h
Proportion of marriages that end in divorce
which we set to N = 5. There is no remarriage: this assumption simplies computation sub-
stantially and partly understates the value of divorcing; we correct for this by appropriately
calibrating a multiplicative utility weight for divorcees which matches the aggregate divorce
rate30. When a divorce occurs, individual utility is weighted by a multiplicative weight for
divorcees, (d). Former partners set up their own households and revert to the optimization
problem for (divorced) single agents.
4.1 The One-Shock versus the Two-Shock Model: Explicit Health
Risk
We begin this section by focusing on the mechanisms at work in the single-shock AR(1) model
vis-a-vis a two-shock model with disability and human capital accumulation. Our goal is to
assess how far a ner shock representation, together with endogenous human capital accumu-
lation, can go in reconciling model and data. For this exercise, we shut down intrahousehold
transfers of time and most endogenous aspects of marriage. We assume that individuals are
30The endogenous divorce rate (21%) is roughly the divorce rate of rst marriages in Canada.
34matched exogenously (assortatively by education) so that 85% of the population of each gen-
der receives a match and the rest remain single.31 Moreover we set the courting period N to
one year, so that marital pairs form instantaneously. Individual pairs still bargain over their
household sharing rule; however, since individuals dier only by education at the start of life,
all education-specic pairs choose the same bargaining parameter.
In order to assess the ability of a single shock model to capture responses to disability-like
shocks, we need to generate a sample of individuals whose experiences make them comparable
to the `disabled' sample in the SLID and in the data simulated from the two-shock model. This
is how we do it: we rst estimate a standard AR(1) shock process, like the one described in
(6) from SLID data.32 The persistence parameters of the AR1 shock, , are 0.944 for men and
0.957 for women, and the variances of the shocks are 0.021 for men and 0.018 for women. We
then discretize the estimated shock range into seven levels, with 1/3 of individuals receiving
the mean shock of zero in any period. The simulated \disabled" sample includes those who
happen to receive negative shocks (of any magnitude) in at least 2 out of every 5 sample
periods, over a ten-year window. \Onset" refers to the year corresponding to the rst shock
in this unusually high sequence of perturbations. The resulting mean age of \onset" is 33,
compared to 34 for the disabled population in the simulated two-shock economy.
Figure 8 plots the predicted total hours response of men in the one-shock and two-shock
simulations. The simulation based on the two-shock process does a marginally better job
of matching the chronicity of the labor supply response to disability, but the dierences
are negligible. Things change dramatically, however, when we disaggregate responses by
marital status, as shown in gure 9. Married men (the blue line) reduce their labor supply
in response to a shock, then gradually increase their labor supply over time, either because
they receive better shocks or because the wealth eect of the bad shocks begins to dominate
the substitution eect. Single men (the green line), on the other hand, actually increase their
labor supply in response to a sequence of negative wage shocks. These eects are consistent
with life cycle theory and with analytical predictions described in section 1 for the case in
which the negative wealth eects outweigh substitution eects. However, these patterns are
at odds with observed responses to disability shocks, especially for single men.
The ability of the two-shock model to provide a better approximation to the dynamic
labor supply of men is due to the nature of disability shocks, as discussed in section 3:
the reduction in the individual's total disposable time makes him less likely to respond to
negative shocks by increasing his labor supply. Nevertheless, the basic two-shock model is
still unable to solve either of the \puzzles" described in Section 1. In gure 9 we observe
that married men reduce their labor supply more than singles in response to a disability
shock. This is expected, because in a model with no divorce and very little initial sorting,
marriage provides a lot of insurance: the presence of a second earner in the household reduces
the negative wealth eect of a disability shock and allows the disabled spouse to reduce his
labour supply more in response to the shock. As well, given that transfers of time are not
31We choose a M high enough so that those who are matched always choose to marry and remain married
until death.
32Results of this estimation are presented in table 5, Appendix 2.










One shock model: all men Data: all men










One shock model: all men Data: all men
(b) Two shock model
available, an `added worker' eect emerges as the optimal response for the spouse. These
eects are evident in gure 10, which plots the simulated spousal responses or `added worker'
eects. The one-shock and two-shock models produce large, nearly identical, added worker
eects.
4.2 Unrestricted Model Results: Labor Supply Responses and
Marital Patterns
Given the failure of the basic two-shock model to resolve the puzzles, we move on to show
the results for the two-shock model in which there are no restrictions on intrahousehold
time-transfers and on marriage choices. Figures 11-14 show simulated dynamic labor supply
responses to shocks for the `disabled' and `chronic-disabled' samples, corresponding to simi-
larly dened groups in the SLID. We consider the model's performance along the total hour,
intensive hour and extensive hour margins.
The model captures patterns of total labor supply for married and single men, both for
the `disabled' and `chronic disabled' populations dened in section 2. Specically, we are able
to rationalize the larger and more gradual drop for single men relative to married men: as in
the data, by the tenth year after onset, single men in the `disabled' group have reduced their
hours more than twice as much than married men. The model also captures the same broad
patterns for hours of workers and for participation.
Figure 15 shows corresponding eects for the post-onset path of wages for the disabled
sample. Wages fall slightly at onset, then continue to fall over the next ten years. Unsur-
prisingly, the eects are larger for single men, who experience larger declines in average work
hours, than for married men. This patterns are, again, consistent with what we observe in
the data.
What drives these results? It turns out that the primary mechanism by which the re-
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Two shock model: husbands Two shock model: single
(b) Two shock model








One shock model: wives Two shock model: wives
stricted and unrestricted two-shock models dier is the endogeneity of marriage, and in
particular the selection into and out of marriage. Marital sorting creates a pool of singles
with dierent characteristics from marrieds and with lower average returns to labor. For
this group, withdrawing from the labor force in response to shocks, and claiming benets, is
relatively more attractive. A secondary mechanism driving the dierences between marrieds
and singles is the set of changes induced by health and disability shocks on married mens'
bargaining power within their marriage. Falling into ill health can reduce a husband's rel-
ative utility weighting within the household, so that household "pressures" eectively limit
the drop in hours worked. This second eect is not directly observable in data, while the role
of sorting is observable and therefore testable.
To give some insight into how and to what extent marital sorting works in the model,
table 7 (similar to table 3 in section 2) reports the observed joint distribution of marital status
and disability status in the adult SLID population and its counterpart in the unrestricted,
simulated economy. In both data and model, married men are much less likely to report a























Full model: singles Data: singles
(b) Single Men























Full model: singles Data: singles
(b) Single men
disability over a six-year window than single or divorced men, and are much less likely relative
to their unmarried counterparts to report a disability in ve or more years out of six. Since,
conditional on exogenously varying health (rsk), all men are subject to the same process for
disability, these eects are driven entirely by sorting. Men who are perceived as high health
risks (those who transition into rsk state 2 or 3 early in life) marry much less in the model,
while married men who receive bad health shocks are more likely to divorce over the long-run.
Figure 16 shows the patterns of divorce, by duration of marriage, generated by the model
and compares it to the corresponding measure from data on Canadian marriages beginning
between 1973 and 1986. As in the real world, divorce in the model is concentrated early in
the couple's life cycle, after an initial series of shocks is realized. Early in the life cycle, and























Full model: singles Data: singles
(b) Single Men





























































Full model: singles Data: singles
(b) Single men
the marriage, shocks convey a lot of information about a partner's ability to provide future
income and insurance. These early shocks are therefore more likely to trigger a divorce than
are similar shocks experienced at later stages of the life-cycle.
4.3 `Added Worker' Eects and Intrahousehold Time Transfers
The second puzzle described in section 1 is the near absence of added worker eects, par-
ticularly for wives, in Canadian and American data, in spite of the apparently large wealth
costs associated with disability onset in the household head. If marriage provides insurance
through consumption transfers, we should observe large swings in married individuals' labor
supplies in response to a spouse's disability onset, like we do in both the AR1 and in the























Full model: single Data: single
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Table 7: Age-adjusted observed and simulated disability by marital status: 40-49 year olds
Data Simulation
Frequency NM M S/D W Frequency NM M S/D W
of reports (z) (%) (%) (%) (%) of reports (z) (%) (%) (%) (%)
0 0.516 0.634 0.501 0.583 0 0.48.8 0.586 0.500 0.563
1-2 0.252 0.222 0.264 0.240 1-2 0.323 0.300 0.310 0.308
3-4 0.108 0.082 0.121 0.097 3-4 0.101 0.076 0.109 0.095
5-6 0.095 0.061 0.115 0.079 5-6 0.087 0.038 0.081 0.035
`basic' two-shock model.
The unrestricted model, on the other hand, generates almost no added worker eects, like
in the data. The solid red line in gure 17 plots spousal labor supply responses for the full,
unrestricted model. In the same gure we also report (gold line) the spousal labor responses
when, everything else equal, we do not allow any time transfers. It becomes apparent that
shutting down the time transfers technology is enough, by itself, to reverse the added worker
eect result and generate counterfactual responses.
Why does the full, unrestricted model generate such a small added worker eect? Two
simple eects, which naturally arise when we don't restrict intrahousehold time-transfers,
explain this result. First, the wealth eects of disability are typically lower for married
couples in the full model than in the basic two-shock model, or in a model with time transfers
shut down. In part, this is driven by marriage market selection: women tend to marry men
with relatively higher earnings, so that households can more easily self-insure against the
risk of early retirement. For the most part, however, the wealth eect is generated directly
through additional specialization within marriage, which allows husbands to devote more
time to labor activities.
To give an idea of the magnitudes involved, table 8 reports some results based on the
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comparisons of two simulations: one for the full, unrestricted model; the other for same
economy, but with all time transfers exogenously and ex-post (after marriage decisions have
been taken) set to zero. By construction, matching, marriage and divorce are identical in
the two economies: the only dierence is that in the second economy all time transfers are
magically reversed.
The rst row of table 8 shows the change in the average marriage surplus across the two
economies. Marriage surplus is dened here as the dierence between the sum of wife's and
husband's value functions in marriage and the sum of wife's and husband's value functions
in the event of divorce. It is roughly 15% lower in the model without time transfers than in
the parallel unrestricted economy. The next three rows show that eliminating time transfers
leads to a modest reduction in the average married male wage of close to 5%; to a negligible
corresponding increase in average wife's wage; and to a proportionally larger drop of close to
417% in married households' earned income.
These results are consistent with two facts:
1. from subsection 4.1 we know that labor supply responses to negative wealth (perma-
nent income) changes can be strong. The negative wealth eect from the loss of time
transfers, stimulates labor supply by husbands. The greater resulting share of dispos-
able time devoted to labor compensates to some extent for the labor hours lost due to
the reduction in husbands' total disposable time in the absence of time transfers, and
prevents large drops in husbands' human capital;
2. the low wage returns to women are fully consistent with the low returns to work for
women estimated in section 3.1.3. This eect is exacerbated by the fact that women
who invest the most in making time transfers to their husbands are those with very low
wages and poor prospects for accumulating human capital in the rst place.
The slightly larger eect on household earned income relative to wages arises in part due
to the fact that couples are poorer in eective resources, with less potential for the husband
to rise up through the wage distribution. As a result, a greater share of marrieds (about
1.5% in any period) nd it optimal to withdraw from the labor market and go on welfare or
disability insurance. The last row of table 8 shows the eect on marriage rates if we allow
individuals to choose their marital status in the no-time-transfer economy, ceteris paribus.
The total amount of marriage that takes place before age 25, the last year of courtship, falls
from 88.5% to 77.1%. which is consistent with the drop in marriage surplus.
Table 8: Quantifying the Relevance of Time Transfers
Unrestricted model Model w/o time transfers
Average marriage surplus .0713 .0613
Average male wage $17.70 $16.90
Average female wage $15.70 $15.85
Average hh incomea $1,114 $1,041
Share of matched pairs who marry 88.5% 77.1%
aWeekly income of working-age married households, excluding benets
4.3.1 Investigating the Dynamic, Joint labor Supply of Couples
The most powerful mechanism working against an added worker eect in the full model is
the dynamic incentive for wives to maintain their husbands' human capital stock over the
life-cycle, which leads to higher household wealth in the long run. When a husband receives
a negative shock, wives may nd it optimal to increase the amount of time devoted to the
spouse (as a response to disability, we think of this as \caring"), even though a labor-limiting
disability shock acts like a negative wage shock in the short run, and even though doing
42Table 9: Time Transfers and Disability Shocks
Table 10: Wife's Time Transfer Response to Couple's Wage Ratio and Husband's ds
Estimates from PSID/ATUS
All hhs hhs under 30 hhs 31-45 hhs 46-60
w 1:90 2:69 2:53 1:15
ds > 1 2:91  0:48 3:99 3:14
Simulation results
All hhs hhs under 30 hhs 31-45 hhs 46-60
w 1:54 5:82 2:22 1:20
ds > 1 1:11 0:38 1:90 1:09
so naturally reduces the time available for her to increase her own labor supply. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, we observe this behavior in both the unrestricted model and in the data.
Some evidence in support of the time transfers mechanism is reported in table 9, which
contains the estimated change in h, the intrahousehold time transfer from wife to husband,
associated to changes in husband's disability status and the couple's wage ratio, for both
model and data. The top panel reports results from a PSID sample of husbands and wives,
using the imputed measures of nll (non labor, non leisure) time from the ATUS, as described
in section 3.2 and Appendix 2; the bottom panel shows the results for the same regression
using simulated data on couples in which the husband is currently working.33 The magnitudes
of the eects are smaller for the simulated data, but the broad patterns are similar: on
average, total time transfers from wife to husband are higher when the husband is currently
disabled, controlling for the couple's relative wages. Moreover, the eects are always strongest
for households in the prime of the life cycle, between ages 30 and 45, because of the high
marginal value of human capital at those ages. In contrast, the response of h to the couple's
wage ratio w declines monotonically over the life cycle in both data and model. The dierence
between the timing of the strongest responses to ds and w has to do with the magnitude of
the average disability shock, which is increasing into middle age. Realizations of relatively
high values of n and l become more common among middle age men receiving any disability
shock and necessitate a stronger response from the wife to prevent their labor supply from
falling. This eect counters the declining importance of the husband's human capital to
household permanent income as the couple ages.
4.4 Insurance within Marriage
The results described above suggest many interesting questions about the insurance role of
marriage: how do spouses fare under the marriage contract? Who gains the most from
33The last restriction is imposed because we only observe the couple's wage ratio if both members worked
in the previous year. Very severely disabled husbands who are not currently working are therefore excluded
from both estimations.
43marriage and who is excluded? The labor supply and marital sorting results outlined above
suggest that men who receive bad shocks early in life may lose the insurance oered by
marriage { that is, they are excluded on the extensive margin. However, conditional on being
within a marriage, the implied insurance value is dierent between spouses and over the
life-cycle.
Figure 18 shows the life-cycle prole of the sharing rule parameter  for couples34, dis-
aggregated by whether the husband is currently in the low risk (blue line) or high risk (red
line) health state. The rst gure shows the s averaged over all marriages in the model;
the right hand side gure considers only couples who, once married, never divorce. The
similarity between the pictures suggests that divorce patterns are not driving most of the
life-cycle variation in  directly. Unsurprisingly, the  for high-risk husbands (excluding the
chronic disabled) lies above the line for the lower health risk husbands, especially for younger
households for whom the husband's high health risk is a bad sign for future earnings: recall
that men move from the low to the high-risk state monotonically and at an increasing rate
over the life cycle. Early transitions to the high-risk, poor-health state signal to spouses or
potential spouses that the husband will not be a productive mate.
Figure 19 provides a window into the main mechanism driving the change in : renego-
tiation. The left-hand panel shows the share of successful female-triggered (the blue line)
and male-triggered (the red line) renegotiations for low-risk households; the right-hand panel
shows the same thing for high-risk households. The gures suggest that the path of the mean
 by age plotted in gure 18 actually masks much of the movement in  among married cou-
ples. For instance, at age 30, about 9% of high-risk households and 7% of low-risk households
renegotiate their marriage contract successfully, compared to less than 2% of households that
divorce. The U-shape of renegotiations over the life cycle suggests (consistent with the di-
vorce results) that marriages become more stable the longer the couple is together. In part
this is due to the consumption costs of children. Couples who are close to splitting do so
before children arrive in order to avoid ending up as single parents with the associated high
consumption costs ~ n. However, it is also due to the fact that, as shocks are realized and
uncertainty resolved over the early years of a marriage, additional information becomes less
and less important and increasingly unlikely to break up the match. This patterns hold until
changes in the relative value of marriage and worsening health of husbands once again desta-
bilize the match close to retirement. However, the spate of late-in-life renegotiations generate
little divorce. From the gures, it is also clear that low-risk marriages (i.e. marriages in which
the husband is in the good or low-risk health state) are more stable overall: less renegotiation
is triggered within these marriages at every age relative to high-risk marriages.
Another interesting question is who triggers renegotiation. For younger households, wives
in low-risk marriages trigger renegotiations slightly more than their husbands, producing the
very gradual rise in mean  observed in gure 18. The reason is that, in low-risk marriages,
the initial  is relatively lower. If the wife receives a series of positive shocks relative to the
husband, she is more likely to threaten a divorce than the other way round - that is, if the
husband, who is already relatively powerful within the marriage, receives a series of good
34This parameter indicates how large a weight wife's utility has within a household.
44shocks relative to the wife.
The opposite occurs for high-risk marriages. Within these marriages, a greater share of
renegotiation (about 0.5% of marriages per year) is triggered by high-risk husbands than by
their wives. High-risk men derive large utility gains from marriage early in life due to the
availability of spousal transfers that aid in the accumulation of human capital and provide
insurance versus expected early shock realizations. As these husbands age, their gains from
marriage decrease as \buer stocks" of human capital and assets are accumulated. When a
husband's gains from the marriage at the initial high  become non-positive, a renegotiation
is triggered and a new lower  is agreed upon.
Finally, as couples age toward retirement, renegotiations are increasingly triggered by
wives. The eect varies relatively little across the husband's health type since the distinction
between health types fades close to retirement; by age 60, most husbands have already moved
or are expected to soon move into the high health-risk state. Husbands' relative gains from
marriage increase as they approach retirement: this is due to the approaching loss of labor
income, the fact that assets would be split evenly in divorce and the increasing health risk
due to age.35
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(b) : Couples who do not divorce
The gains from marriage to men are large: in the model, the mean wage of a married man
is $20.50 per hour, compared to $15.25 for an unmarried man, which is slightly smaller than
the dierence of about $6 observed in the data.36 Figure 20 shows some additional cross-
sectional results. We report only results for men, for whom the model performs best and for
35Wives are not subject to leisure shocks in the model, only to wage shocks. Since all uncertainty in the
wife's life, save mortality risk, is resolved by age 65, and she is assured of her Old Age Security benet as
well as half of accumulated household assets in the event of divorce, her gains from marriage fall approaching
retirement and renegotiation drives the average  back up. It would be interesting to what extent old age
dynamics change if we relax the assumption that women do not receive leisure-limiting disability shocks in
old age.
36For women, being married slightly reduces the average wage, but the eects are much smaller than the
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(b) Renegotiations: high risk couples
whom we have specied the full spectrum of life-cycle risk. The top panels of gure 20 plot
the distribution of log wages for men by marital status: the left-hand panel shows the tted
variances generated by the model and the right-hand panel shows the corresponding tted
variances from the full sample of men in the SLID, in both cases for the bottom 98% of the
wage distribution. The model provides a good t to the data, generating total cross-sectional
variances in log wages of about 0.245 for single men and 0.247 for married men, which is
nearly identical to the measure calculated from the sample of men in the SLID. In both the
data and the model, the variance of wages is slightly higher for single men over most of the
life cycle, before the pattern reverses around age 45 to 50.
The bottom right panel of gure 20 shows the corresponding cross-sectional variances
of the log of consumption for men generated by the model.37 Note that, while the life
cycle variance of log wage varies only slightly by marital status, the life cycle variance of
log consumption is quite dierent for marrieds and singles: in general, the variance of log
consumption is larger for single men than for married men, but it remains relatively at
through middle age, one most marriage market sorting has been realized. The dierences
between marrieds and singles and the patterns over the life cycle can be ascribed to three
main eects: (1) sorting into and out of marriage; (2) the increasing reliance of poorer single
men on either disability or early retirement benets in middle age; and (3) the absence of intra-
household consumption sharing by a spouse. The rst eect will tend to cause a contraction
in the variance if sorting out of marriage generates a relatively homogeneous group of less
endowed males. The second eect is responsible for the attening of the consumption prole
for singles in middle age.
The third eect is our main concern, however. To this end, gure 20(d) in the bottom right
hand panel of gure 20 provides a somewhat cleaner indication of the consumption insurance
gains for men. In the data there is almost no dierence between married and single women's wages.
37Unfortunately, no corresponding consumption data is available in the SLID.
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(d) Dev-RMUC
value of marriage for men. It plots the absolute value of deviations in the ratio of men's year-
to-year marginal utilities of consumption ( uct
uct+1) from the theoretical full-insurance value. In
a world with full insurance (including fair annuities to insure against mortality risk), the
intertemporal ratio of marginal utilities would be a constant equal to the product of the male
discount rate m and the interest rate. In the model, deviations from this value (Dev-RMUC
in shorthand) represent deviations from full insurance. Figure 20(d) suggests that deviations
from full insurance are much larger for single men than for married men, by more than 100%
around age 40, using the Dev-RMUC metric. For both marrieds and singles, the Dev-RMUC
falls over middle age as uncertainty is resolved and assets are accumulated. The sharper fall
for singles is again due to their inferior labor market outcomes, as observed in section 4.2: in
fact, single men in the model are more than three times more likely not to be working than
47married men between the ages of 40 and 55.38 Early retirement with a xed benet naturally
resolves much of the life-cycle uncertainty for single men and thereby brings them closer to
the full-insurance benchmark.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we study the dynamic responses of households to a specic class of idiosyncratic
shocks. By using detailed panel information about the timing, persistence and responses
to disability (health) shocks we document the patterns of dynamic optimal responses by
gender and marital status. We then show that most predictions of a `basic' household model,
with persistent idiosyncratic risk, are at odds with the observed data patterns: we nd that
this model fails in several dimensions, including timing, magnitude and persistence of the
optimal household responses to health shocks. We argue that this puzzle can be solved
if we remove some of the restrictions implicit in the `basic' model and allow for a richer
set of intra-household allocations and marriage participation decisions. We show that the
dynamic responses observed in the data are consistent with a model in which people sort
endogenously into marriage and, conditional on being married, people can provide insurance
through transfers of time, as well as consumption. We provide micro-data evidence in support
of both these mechanisms: in particular we show that increased transfers of time tend to
occur when disability shocks hit, and that endogenous marriage sorting goes a long way in
explaining divorce rates and disability report rates by marital status. More importantly, the
unrestricted model generates dynamic labor supply responses which are extremely close to
the ones observed for both singles and couples.
We also investigate how the `marriage' contract is chosen to accommodate the possibility
of idiosyncratic shocks and to provide insurance which is unavailable to single agents. We
nd that main-earners (husbands) tend to transfer consumption to second-earners (wives)
who are happy to trade additional consumption insurance for time transfers in periods of
need. The latter transfers serve as an important mechanism within the household, as they
allow the main earner to smooth labor supply and achieve higher levels of human capital
and earnings. However, in a limited commitment environment, we also show that incentives
to renegotiate (and possible terminate) the contract can arise over the life-cycle because of
the history of idiosyncratic shocks: in particular, we show that the relative value of marriage
changes for men and women as they age. Men who are at high risk of receiving idiosyncratic
shocks value marriage early in life, when they are poor in assets and human capital, while all
men value marriage at the late stages of their working life as they approach retirement and
periods of high health risk. Accordingly, sharing and allocations within households change,
in some cases non-monotonically, over the working life. These changes, typically unobserved
in micro data, play an important role in explaining individual and household responses to
38The participation rates generated by the model are 82% for single men, 96% for married men and 84%
for divorced men between 25 and 54. These compare quite well to observed participation rates by marital
status in Canada of approximately 84%, 94% and 86% for single, married and divorced men respectively.
48shocks, and labor supply decisions, over the life cycle.
Appendix 1: Estimation of longitudinal eects of dis-
ability using the SLID
Disability questions in the SLID
In the SLID, an individual is classied as disabled if he or she reports a limitation along
any of the following dimensions: (1) easily completing one or more routine physical activities
such as climbing stairs; (2) accomplishing required or desired activities `at work' or `at a
job, business or school'; (3) accomplishing required or desired activities `at home'; or (4)
completing required or desired `other activities' such as those associated with transportation
or leisure. The questions about disability limitations `at work' are asked of respondents or
about subjects under 70 who worked in the reference year. The question about disability
limitations `at a job or business or at school' is asked of respondents under 70 who did not
work in the previous year. In the longitudinal le, the responses to these questions are
combined into a single variable reported for the entire sample population under age 70.
For the latter three types of limitation, individuals can respond that their were limited
in the respective type of activity `sometimes' or `often'. Additional questions are asked of
workers who report any type of disability: whether the condition made it dicult to change
jobs or nd a better job; and whether individuals wanted to work more or fewer hours due
to their condition. Individuals who report a limitation but did not work in the previous year
are additionally asked if their condition `completely prevents' them from `working at a job
or business or looking for work'. Finally, individuals who report a current disability along at
least one of the dimensions detailed above are asked about the duration of their condition:
how many years they have had it and whether it was present at birth.
Sample adjustment and creation of \disabled" and \chronic dis-
abled" samples
Two adjustments to the 1999-2004 SLID sample are required before we can be condent that
equation (11) is giving us consistent estimates of the longitudinal eects of disability onset
on individual and/or family responses:
 rst, since questions about the history of disability are asked only of those who report
a current limitation, we expect that the chronicity of an individual's disability to be
correlated with the reported duration of the condition.39 We dene chronicity as the
proportion of periods in which a current disability (latent or limiting) is reported.
39This problem does not arise in the U.S. studies cited above because the assumed year of onset is directly
observed.
49Duration is the number of periods (years) the currently-disabled person claims to have
had the condition previous to joining the SLID panel.40
To deal with this problem, we randomly select individuals from dierent chronicity-
duration \bins" in order to equate chronicity across duration. We dene two sam-
ples, called our `disabled' and `chronic' disabled samples. For the `disabled' sample,
we randomly drop some individuals with especially high chronicity and long reported
durations, and some individuals with especially low chronicity and short reported du-
rations. The mean chronicity for this sample is .45 (close to three of six), which is the
average chronicity of the aggregate currently-disabled SLID population. Our \chronic"
sample roughly corresponds to the chronic sample dened by Meyer and Mok (2006)
and Charles (2003). For this sample, we drop all individuals in all duration bins whose
chronicities are less than .25. For this group, the resulting mean chronicity is .62 or
nearly four of six panels. 41
 the second sample-selection issue deals with establishing control groups which we can
use to estimate the b h
k parameters in (11). If disability shocks are correlated with other
demographic or unobserved eects in the population, the estimated b h
k values will be
inconsistent estimates of the time-from-onset eects because they will also contain infor-
mation about being the sort of individual who reports a disability in the rst place. The
U.S. studies cited above avoid this problem by using as their control groups the future-
disabled who are at least four or ve years from onset and omitting everybody else, the
`never-disabled', from the regressions. However, our short panel makes this an unfea-
sible exclusion. Instead, we use logit-based propensity score matching, with k nearest
neighbors, to establish control groups that combine all future-disabled individuals two
or more years from onset with a comparable subset of the never-disabled. The value of
k, as well as the set of control variables used in the regressions, is set optimally through
trial and error for each gender and marital status category. Matching is performed on
selected demographic (e.g. education, urbanization, region), life-cycle (e.g. age, size
of household, whether paying or receiving private support) and subjective (e.g. health
status, level of stress) variables, as well as occupation dummies. Table 11 reports the
results from this selection procedure for the `average' disabled sample. Results for the
chronic group are broadly similar and are available in Gallipoli and Turner (2008). The
columns report coecients from dummy variable regressions of each dependent variable
in the table on the indicator function associated to being a future-disabled. In the rst
and third columns, the omitted (benchmark) category is the unselected never-disabled
(UND). In the second and fourth columns the omitted category is the selected never-
disabled (SND) from the propensity matching. Asterisks indicate dierences at the 5%
40The rst report of long-term disabilities do not necessarily occur in the rst year of the panel. We also
assume the actual duration of the condition is the rst one reported when the condition becomes current.
41One drawback is that this procedure necessarily omits individuals reporting their rst ever limitation after
the nal two years of the panel: for these individuals we lack sucient post-onset information to determine
chronicity.
50signicance level, based on boot-strapped standard errors from fty resamplings.
The results in Table 11 suggest that propensity matching is largely eective: for all four
gender-marital status groups there are almost no signicant dierences between the `selected-
in never-disabled' and the `future-disabled' groups. This stands in sharp contrast to the
`unselected never-disabled' who appear to dier signicantly along labor supply, income and
demographic dimensions from the `future-disabled'. The possible exception to this general
point are single men, for whom the propensity matching decreases the similarity of the groups
along some dimensions, such as own earnings, and improves it along others, such as transfers
and household income. The results are especially strong and encouraging for the economic
variables we report (hours worked, participation rates, individual earnings and transfers re-
ceived and household-level income), which are not included as regressors in the propensity
score logit regressions.
Table 11: Propensity matching results: Average disabled group
Variable Singles Married
UND SND UND SND
Men
Demographic
Age 6.94* 2.31* 1.39* 0.84*
HH size -0.34* 0.01 -0.079 -0.11*
Education 0.026 -0.038 -0.068 -0.029
Economic
Hours -2.29 -45.34 27.27 -19.63
Participation 0.019 0.028 .061* 0.024
HH income -9285.39* 3115.38 -7503.93* -4099.89
Ind transfers 924.42* 136.56 -174.49 -24.39
Ind earnings 554.12 1574.85 -5093.6* -1799.93s
Women
Demographic
Age 12.99* 0.005 0.103 -0.15
HH size -0.621* 0.007 0.041 0.034
Education 0.718 -0.16* 0.061 0.04
Economic
Hours 195.54* 40.66 9.37 5.65
Participation 0.045* -0.013 0.056* -0.01
HH income -11622.8* -4.79 -9758.56* -2066.7
Ind transfers 1111.03* 345.32 127.05 -126.14
Ind earnings 4540.24* -2747.71 -3110.75* -974.61
51Appendix 2: Methodological issues and supplemental es-
timates for the numerical model
Specication for the human capital process for men and women
To estimate the dynamic human capital process given in table 4 in section 3.1.3, we adopt a
four-stage estimation process that controls for possible endogeneity. In the rst stage, we use
Wooldridge (1995)'s panel data selection estimator to calculate inverse Mills ratios for the
likelihood of observing a wage for all individual-year observations in the sample. This method
controls for individual xed eects through the inclusion of time-averages of the covariates
used to predict the wage. Our exclusion restrictions are: current household income from
investments, household size and number of children, a dummy for having experienced a death
in the family in the previous year, and measures of the annual provincial unemployment rate
and the deviation in this rate from its 10-year average. In the second stage, we predict hours
in 2001- 2003 using hours in 1999, and the human capital stocks in 2001-2003 by the wage
observed in 1999 (adjusted for selection and xed eects using the inverse Mills ratios and
the time-averages of the covariates.) In the third stage, we estimate the main parameters of
our human capital equation using our instrumented values of lagged hours and lagged wages
as regressors. Our sample here is limited to the last three observations for men and women
in the 1999 panel who appear and report all information needed for the regression in all six
years of the panel. In the fourth stage, we substitute the actual lags of hours and wages for
the instruments and use the consistent marginal eects from the third stage to compute a
new set of residuals. In the fourth stage, we apply a non-linear least squares estimator to the
residuals to estimate the parameters of the individual shock process. Our estimates at this
stage strongly suggest that the error process is i.i.d. We also re-estimated the entire system
without instrumenting for the lags of hours and wages and also nd no evidence that the
shock to human capital is autocorrelated.
Estimation of spousal time transfers: PSID and ATUS
To arrive at the results reported in table 5 in section 3.2, we start by imputing measures of nll
time to our PSID sample. From the ATUS sample, we calculate housework as a share of total
nll activity for individuals at dierent ages, genders, urban/rural classication, education,
and number of children. We then use the reported annual hours of housework in the PSID
and the demographics-coecients to impute total nll time (i.e. ~ h) to the entire PSID sample.
Next, we use the assumption that ~ hi = hi for singles to calculate the determinants of h for
the PSID sample of unmarried men and women. Regressors in this stage again include age
terms, education, gender, number of children and urban/rural classication, as well as number
of pre-school age children. This allows us to assign a measure of h to married individuals
in the PSID sample, based on the assumptions that neither h nor the share of housework in
total nll activity varies directly with marital status (though both vary strongly by number
of children, which is highly correlated with marital status).
52Finally, we use our imputed/estimated measures of h and ~ h to calculate hi for married
individuals, using the identity hi = ~ h h. We derive estimates of a, b,  and  by applying a
nonlinear systems of equations estimator to (23), using our constructed hi and the couple's
wage ratio w as the dependent and independent variables. The sample of PSID couples used
at this last stage meets the following conditions: (1) both members worked at least 200 hours
in the previous year, (2) neither member reported a disability, (3) the husband is at least 45,
and (4) w falls between 0.25 and 4. The rst two restrictions ensure that we are dealing with
an interior solution and that the wage rate is an accurate measure of the consumption-leisure
trade o. The restriction to older couples is intended to minimize the possible bias introduced
by the presence of human capital considerations in the FOCs, which are likely to be largest
for young workers.
Single-shock \basic" model parameter estimates from the SLID
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